Finance:Budget-feasible mechanism
From HandWiki
In mechanism design, a branch of economics, a budget-feasible mechanism is a mechanism in which the total payment made by the auctioneer is upper-bounded by a fixed pre-specified budget. They were first presented by Yaron Singer,[1] and studied by several others.[2][3][4]
References
- ↑ Singer, Yaron (2010-10-01). "Budget Feasible Mechanisms". 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. pp. 765–774. doi:10.1109/FOCS.2010.78. ISBN 978-1-4244-8525-3. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5671347.
- ↑ Chen, Ning; Gravin, Nick; Lu, Pinyan (2011-01-23), "On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms", Proceedings of the 2011 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Proceedings (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics): pp. 685–699, doi:10.1137/1.9781611973082.54, ISBN 978-0-89871-993-2
- ↑ Horel, Thibaut; Ioannidis, Stratis; Muthukrishnan, S. (2014). Pardo, Alberto; Viola, Alfredo. eds. "Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design" (in en). LATIN 2014: Theoretical Informatics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer) 8392: 719–730. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54423-1_62. ISBN 978-3-642-54423-1. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-54423-1_62.
- ↑ Jalaly Khalilabadi, Pooya; Tardos, Éva (2018). Christodoulou, George; Harks, Tobias. eds. "Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations" (in en). Web and Internet Economics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Cham: Springer International Publishing) 11316: 246–263. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_17. ISBN 978-3-030-04612-5. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_17.
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